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One of the standard objections against citizenship systems and trade 
organizations in the premodern world has been their exclusiveness. Privileged 
access to certain professions and industries is seen as a disincentive for 
technological progress. Guilds, especially, have been portrayed as providing unfair 
advantages to established masters and their descendants, over immigrants and 
other outsiders. In this paper the results of detailed local investigations of the 
composition of citizenries and guild apprentices and masters is brought together, 
to find out to what extent this picture is historically correct. This data offers an 
indirect measurement of the accessibility of citizenship and guilds that allows 
insight into the mechanisms of exclusion and their impact. The paper finds that 
guild masterships were in most towns open to large numbers of immigrants and 
non-family, as were training markets for apprentices. Therefore, we argue, our 
understanding of urban and guild ‘monopolies’, and the measure of protection and 
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It is generally assumed that restricted access to urban manufacturing and trade 
constrained the premodern economy. Restricted access was part of a wider set of 
regulations that imposed political constraints on economic development 
(‘feudalism’). Urban citizenship regimes generally limited some, or even all, 
economic roles to full citizens, or burgesses, freemen, bourgeois, burgers, Bürger, 
and so on. Within most cities, access to specific economic roles was further 
constrained by guilds. Guilds were established by documents that laid down the 
ground rules for their role in society and were approved and supported by local 
governments.1 In some cities, moreover, guilds dominated the local government. 
This combination of urban citizenship and guild regulation has been portrayed by 
many economic historians as a great villain in restricting access to markets, and 
thus hampering progress.2 The guilds’ abolition, and the emergence of national 
citizenship in the nineteenth century is, in turn, one of the conventional 
explanations for industrialisation and modern economic growth.3 
 
A standard element of the guild organisation was that the members were granted, 
as a privilege of their membership, the right to produce and sell a specific product, 
or range of products, to the exclusion of all non-members. This privilege is usually 
called the guild ‘monopoly’. While monopoly is commonly understood in terms of 
                                                 
1 Unless stated otherwise, this article ignores merchant and shopkeepers’ guilds, which faced 
different challenges, and often had different recruitment practices. Wherever the term ‘guild’ is 
used in the text, it should therefore be read to mean ‘craft guild’. 
2 Peter Kriedte, Peasants, landlords and Merchant Capitalists: Europe and the World Economy, 
1500-1800 (Leamington Spa, 1983): 9; Carlo Cipolla, Before the Industrial Revolution: European 
Society and Economy, 1000-1700 (New York, 1980, 2nd ed.): 256; Joel Mokyr, The Lever of Riches: 
Technological Creativity and Economic Progress (Oxford, 1990): 77, 258-260, 267, 298; David S. 
Landes, Revolution in Time: Clocks and the Making of the Modern World (Cambridge Ma, 1983): 
219; Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some are So Rich and Some So Poor (London, 
1998): 174, 223, 239, 242-245; Peter Musgrave, The Early Modern European Economy (London, 
1999): 71, 73, 89; Joel Mokyr, The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy 
(Princeton, 2002): 31, 259-260; Sheilagh Ogilvie, Institutions and European Trade: Merchant 
Guilds, 1000-1800 (Cambridge, 2011): ch. 3; David Stasavage, ‘Was Weber Right? The Role of 
Urban Autonomy in Europe’s Rise’, American Political Science Review, 108 (2014): 337-340. 
3 Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power Prosperity and 
Poverty (London, 2012): 294; Michael P. Fitzsimmons, From Artisan to Worker: Guilds, the French 
State, and the Organization of Labor, 1776-1821 (Cambridge, 2010): ch. 4; Jeffrey Frieden and 
Ronald Rogowski, ‘Modern Capitalism: Enthusiasts, Opponents, and Reformers’, in: Larry Neal 
and Jeffrey G. Williamson, eds., The Cambridge History of Capitalism, vol. II: The Spread of 
Capitalism: from 1848 to the Present (Cambridge, 2014): 386, 390-391; Peter Clark, European Cities 
and Towns 400-2000 (Oxford, 2009): 258-259. 
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the output market, successful prosecution of market power also requires 
restriction on the entrance of new producers. As Gary Richardson already pointed 
out in 2001, what historians of guilds have in mind when they discuss issues of 
monopoly is something akin to Adam Smith’s definition in The Wealth of Nations 
(1776): ‘laws which restrain, in particular employments, the competition to a 
smaller number than might otherwise go into them’.4 Questions have been raised, 
however, about the effectiveness of the monopoly: could guilds really monitor and 
enforce, especially in large urban centres, their ‘monopoly’? Or were they undercut 
by interlopers and illicit producers, on the one hand, and by supplies of goods from 
other localities, some without guilds, on the other?5  
 
The objective of monopoly is to drive up prices above the level achieved by open 
competition, to the advantage of the monopolist. In the context of guilds in Early 
Modern Europe, it is difficult to demonstrate whether this was actually happening. 
Therefore, many historians have instead looked at the supply side. As Smith’s 
definition implies, if guilds managed to limit their membership, in terms of 
numbers, of geographical backgrounds, and of descent, this would more or less 
automatically have implied rents – for all members, for locals, or for the masters’ 
offspring. The extent to which guilds were ‘open’ or ‘closed’, therefore has 
implications not only for the size of rents that accrue to guild members, but also 
to how these opportunities were distributed more broadly across European 
societies. As Sheilagh Ogilvie states the position in a recent survey: ‘To establish 
their monopolies and monopsonies, guilds excluded entrants’.6 In earlier work on 
guilds, she found strong evidence that ‘guilds seek to restrict entry so as to limit 
                                                 
4 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. by R. H. 
Campbell, A. S. Skinner and W. B. Todd, Glasgow Edition 2 vols. (Oxford, 1976), I, 79 (book I, vii, 
28); Gary Richardson, ‘A Tale of Two Theories: Monopolies and Craft Guilds in Medieval England 
and Modern Imagination’, Journal of the History of Economic Thought 23 (2001): 217-242; see also 
Michael Sonenscher, Work and Wages: Natural Law, Politics and the Eighteenth-Century French 
Trades (Cambridge, 1989): 107. 
5 Steven L. Kaplan, ‘Les corporations, les “faux ouvriers” et le faubourg Saint-Antoine au XVIIIe 
siècle’, Annales ESC 43 (1988): 353-378; S.R. Epstein, ‘Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship, and 
Technological Change in Pre-Industrial Europe’ Journal of Economic History 58 (1998) : 686; 
James R. Farr, Artisans in Europe, 1300-1914 (Cambridge, 2000): 82. 
6 Sheilagh Ogilvie, ‘The Economics of Guilds’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 28 (2014): 174; 
Mokyr, Gifts of Athena, 260; Ogilvie, Institutions and European trade, 51-62. 
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competition’.7 Guild membership, it has also been claimed, was dominated by sons 
of established masters, or by people who had been born locally. Individuals without 
a family relationship to the membership, and especially immigrants, found it 
much more difficult to access incorporated trades.8  
 
In this paper we evaluate the strength of guild ‘monopolies’ by exploring the 
accessibility of guild membership. How easy did those we might term ‘outsiders’ 
find it to become a guild member? This, we argue, offers one way to evaluate the 
significance of the economic constraints that guilds created. The array of formal 
rules established by guilds to define and control who could gain entry have been 
used to highlight the scale of barriers faced by people without a previous 
connection to the urban trades. By implication, they have also been taken as 
indicating the rewards membership brought to insiders.9 To the extent that guilds 
did indeed generate valuable economic rents to insiders, they would also have 
created incentives for others to try to gain access – and for those who were already 
within the guild to try to reserve access to a small pool of their own choosing. 
 
Our concern is with the outcome of this conflict of interest, and we use evidence 
on the extent to which outsiders were actually present as guild members as an 
indicator of the presence of effective barriers to entry. There are, obviously, more 
dimensions to the ‘monopoly’ issue than access. Some German crafts, such as those 
in Frankfurt and Augsburg, for example had annual quotas on the number of new 
masters, and the same happened in Paris.10 Still, if access to the ‘monopoly’ was 
open to large numbers of ‘outsiders’, then it would seem that the exclusive nature 
                                                 
7 Sheilagh Ogilvie, State Corporatism and Proto-Industry: the Württemberg Black Forest, 1580-
1797 (Cambridge, 1997): 463. 
8 Discussion in Tim Leunig, Chris Minns and Patrick Wallis, ‘Networks in the Pre-Modern 
Economy: The Market for London Apprenticeships, 1600-1749’, Journal of Economic History 71 
(2011): 415-16. 
9 Ogilvie, ‘The Economics of Guilds’, 176. 
10 Gerald L. Soliday, A Community in Conflict: Frankfurt Society in the Seventeenth and Early 
Eighteenth Century (Hanover, NH, 1974): 151n41; Kathy Stuart, Defiled Trades and Social 
Outcasts: Honour and Ritual Pollution in Early Modern Germany (Cambridge, 2000): 193; Arnd 
Kluge, Die Zünfte (Stuttgart, 2007): 230-33; Harald Deceulaer and Bibi Panhuysen, ‘Dressed to 
Work: A Gendered Comparison of the Tailoring Trades in the Northern and Southern Netherlands, 
16th to 18th centuries’, in: M. Prak, C. Lis, J. Lucassen and H. Soly, eds., Craft Guilds in the Early 
Modern Low Countries: work, power and representation (Aldershot, 2006): 145. 
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of the ‘monopoly’ was not as strong as is often implied, and could not have led to 
the disastrous outcomes that many historians claim it had. We therefore want to 
find an answer to this straightforward question: were guilds in pre-modern Europe 
open or closed to outsiders?  
 
Four theses have been proposed by historians to explain variations in guild 
openness. The first highlights regional variation. There is a broad consensus that 
English guilds became less important in the eighteenth century, although it has 
also been argued that this was not generally correct; in some economic sectors they 
became less powerful, in others they remained significant.11 This idea has 
expanded to the claim that whilst guilds in England and the Dutch Republic had 
become more open, those of the German lands and possibly other regions remained 
exclusive.12  
 
A second thesis refers to guilds’ political influence: where guilds had a stake in 
local governance, they were able to erect barriers for newcomers.13 A powerful 
example of this relationship comes from sixteenth-century Ghent. Before 1540, 
and again between 1579 and 1584, the guilds of Ghent had a strong voice in local 
government. Between 1541 and 1578, and again after 1584, the Habsburg 
government excluded guilds from local government and promoted an open-door 
policy for guild membership. The brewers, tailors, and other guilds in Ghent were 
forced to become more accessible to outsiders. The Ghent evidence suggests that, 
when left to their own devices, guilds preferred to exclude outsiders from their 
ranks.14 An equally compelling example from the seventeenth and eighteenth 
                                                 
11 Compare Forbes, ‘Search, Immigration and the Goldsmiths’ Company: A Study in the Decline of 
its Powers’, in: Ian Anders Gadd and Patrick Wallis, eds., Guilds, Society and Economy in London 
1450-1800 (London, 2002): 115-125, with Michael Berlin, ‘Guilds in Decline? London Livery 
Companies and the Rise of a Liberal Economy, 1600-1800’, in: S.R. Epstein and Maarten Prak, 
eds., Guilds, Innovation and the European Economy, 1400-1800 (Cambridge, 2008): 316-42. 
12 Ogilvie, State corporatism, 436-37, 449; Paul M. Hohenberg and Lynn Hollen Lees, The Making 
of Urban Europe 1000-1950 (Cambridge Ma., 1985): 128; for Britain alone: David Landes, The 
Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 
1750 to the Present (Cambridge, 1969): 62; Mokyr, Gifts of Athena, 260, 269. 
13 Landes, Revolution in time, 211; Stasavage ‘Was Weber Right?’, 341-42. 
14 Johan Dambruyne, ‘Guilds, Social Mobility and Status in Sixteenth-Century Ghent’, 
International Review of Social History 43 (1998): 51 
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centuries was uncovered by Ogilvie’s investigation of the Wildberg weaving 
district in Württemberg.15 
 
A third thesis, which can be seen as a variation on the first, might be inferred from 
the literature on state-formation. As states became more powerful, we should 
expect them to exert greater control over guilds, and support guilds’ attempts to 
remain exclusive. Therefore, guilds in the eighteenth century might be generally 
more closed to outsiders than they had been in the seventeenth century.16 
Alternatively, it has been argued that states were promoting greater equality and 
therefore attempted to reduce the impact of ‘special interests’ like guilds.17 
 
The fourth thesis looks at the size of communities. In his famous German home 
towns from 1971, Mack Walker connected the German guilds’ strict admission 
rules to the tightness of the face-to-face communities in which they operated. His 
‘home towns’ were typically communities of fewer than ten thousand 
inhabitants.18 From a demographic perspective, Maurice Garden has made the 
same point: large and growing towns were in greater need of immigrants to 
increase their size.19 If this is correct, we should expect more openness in larger 
towns. 
 
In order to evaluate the openness of guilds and the validity of these four theories, 
we need a valid measure of closure. In this paper, ‘outsiders’ are defined in two 
distinct ways: 1. those who were not the descendants of active guild members; 2. 
those originating from outside the town where the guild’s ‘monopoly’ was 
established.  
                                                 
15 Ogilvie, State Corporatism. 
16 Jan de Vries, The Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis, 1600-1750 (Cambridge, 1976): 238; 
Ogilvie, State Corporatism, 475. 
17 S.R. Epstein, Freedom and Growth: The Rise of States and Markets in Europe, 1300-1750 
(London, 2000): 36-37, 110, 146; Clark, European cities, 214; Stasavage, ‘Was Weber Right?’, 353. 
18 Mck P. Walker, German Home Towns: Community, State, and General Estate 1648-1871 (Ithaca, 
1971): 27, 30; but see also Steven Hochstadt, ‘Migration in Preindustrial Germany’, Central 
European History 16 (1983): 195-224 for the opposite view. 
19 Maurice Garden, ‘The Urban Trades: Social Analysis and Representation’, in: Steven L Kaplan 
and Cynthia J. Koepp, eds., Work in France: Representations, Meaning, Organizations, and 
Practice (Ithaca, 1986): 293. 
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Recent scholarship on the history of Europe’s guilds has produced a body of 
information about their membership that is almost by definition local. 
Remarkably, nobody has so far collected and compared these local data. This is 
the objective of the present paper. Limitations in the availability of data means 
that we concentrate on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At times we will 
refer to some sixteenth-century material that is, however, too thin to produce a 
reliable survey. Our paper cannot claim to be exhaustive; the archives hold many 
more data waiting to be explored. We have, however, data about masters for 69 
individual guilds in 19 different towns, plus data on a mixture of guilds for seven 
towns. Together the data cover over 100,000 masters. For apprentices our sample 
is much larger in the number of individuals covered: 450,000. However, they come 
from fewer guilds and places: ten guilds from six towns, plus eleven towns where 
we can observe a mixture of various guilds.  
 
In all, the observations and analyses offered in this article are supported by 
evidence relating to over half a million individuals, across a range of towns from 
Bristol to Vienna and from Gdansk (Danzig) to Madrid. Much of the data relates 
to England and the Low Countries, where some of the most active guild research 
has been concentrated, but there is just enough evidence for France, Germany and 
Central Europe, and for Italy and Spain, to claim that the picture presented here 
is valid for Europe as a whole, rather than for a small – and possibly a-typical – 
part of it. To overcome the dominance of the number of observations from London 
or Paris, we have ignored the volumes and used un-weighted observations in our 
analyses. The results from tiny Wildberg therefore count for as much as those from 
huge London, also because we assume that Wildberg is potentially representative 
of a whole class of small towns. 
 
We proceed as follows. In the next section we discuss the methodological 
challenges involved in measuring openness in labour markets and describe the 
characteristics of the measures of family and geographical openness that we 
employ here. In the second section we present evidence on the openness of guilds 
to new masters without a connection by kinship to an existing guild member. In 
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the third section, we evaluate guilds’ willingness to accept migrants as masters. 
In the fourth section, we look at how important kinship and local origins were to 
obtaining a place as an apprentice. The fifth section evaluates how well our data 
fit with the four main theories on guild openness. We then consider whether or not 
our findings reflect a change from an earlier era of guild practice in the sixteenth 
century or before, whether a more direct comparison of openness using urban 
migration shares produces different conclusions, and the experience of women 
seeking to access guild-regulated labour markets. We conclude that on all of our 
measures, most of Europe’s guilds were more open to outsiders than conventional 
assertions about their exclusive behaviours imply; guild ‘monopolies’ were only 




One methodological challenge for establishing the impact of restrictions on 
entering the economic arena is establishing a benchmark for openness. Critics of 
the guilds often seem to implicitly posit a completely open labour market. Labour 
economists, however, question whether this scenario ever exists outside the 
textbook, with current thinking emphasising the importance of frictions in the 
labour market that generate rents to almost all jobs.20 Formal and informal 
barriers create ‘segments’ that privilege some groups of workers over others. 
Segmented labour markets have also been identified in the pre-industrial period.21 
The implication is that we cannot assume that in the absence of guilds there would 
be no other obstacles producing similar effects.  
 
Clear evidence of this effect in historical labour markets without guilds can be 
found in the period after the decline of the guilds. Some occupations displayed 
strong intergenerational continuities, not necessarily as a result of formal 
                                                 
20 Alan Manning, Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labour Markets (Princeton, 
2003): 3. 
21 Jan de Vries, ‘The Labour Market’, in: Karel Davids and Leo Noordegraaf, eds., The Dutch 
Economy in the Golden Age: Nine Essays (Amsterdam, 1993): 55-78; Clare Haru Crowston, 
Fabricating Women: The Seamstresses of Old Regime France (Durham N.C., 2001): 86-94. 
9 
 
selection mechanisms, even without institutional barriers to entry of the kind that 
guilds provided. In industrial Lancashire, over 60 per cent of textile workers had 
followed their fathers into the same trade, and in nineteenth-century London, 
around half of those working in engineering, building, shoemaking and tailoring 
were engaged in the same occupation as their fathers.22 In modern Canada c. 40 
per cent of young men work for the same employer for which their father also 
worked, and 6–9 per cent have the same employer in adulthood.23 This percentage 
is likely to be higher among the self-employed, who turn over businesses to the 
next generation.24 In other words, the segmentation of the labour market that is 
produced by other factors than guilds in industrial societies raises questions about 
how we can empirically identify the distinctive role of guilds in the promotion or 
inhibition of flexible labour markets in pre-industrial societies.  
 
In this paper, we do not solve this problem, but propose that to some extent it can 
be circumvented by assuming that large numbers of entrants previously unrelated 
to the trade constitutes a situation of openness, while small numbers of ‘new’ 
entrants points in the direction of high barriers. This approach is at the least a 
fair test of the claims made in the current literature about openness. Our aim is 
to map patterns of relative openness that may allow us to assess the causes and 
distribution of barriers, and their likely significance across the European 
landscape of citizenship regimes. As a simple rule of thumb, we classify guilds as 
‘closed’ where two-thirds of masters or apprentices were ‘insiders’, i.e. originated 
locally or, alternatively, were the sons (sometimes daughters) of masters. We 
classify organisations as ‘open’ where two-thirds were ‘outsiders’, i.e. originated 
                                                 
22 S.J. Chapman and W. Abbott, ‘The Tendency of Children to Follow their Father’s Trades’, 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 76 (1913): 66-67; Geoffrey Crossick, An Artisan Elite in 
Victorian England: Kentish London, 1840-1880 (London, 1978): tables 6.4 and 6.5; Richard 
Zijdeman, ‘Like My Father Before Me: Intergenerational Occupational Status Transfer During 
Industrialization (Zeeland, 1811-1915)’, Continuity and Change 24 (2009): 476. 
23 Mark S. Granovetter, Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and Careers (Cambridge Ma., 1974): 5; 
James D. Montgomery, ‘Social Networks and Labor Market Outcomes: Towards an Economic 
Analysis’, American Economic Review 81 (1991): 1408-18; Miles Corak and Patrizio Piraino, ‘The 
Intergenerational Transmission of Employers’, Journal of Labor Economic 29 (2011): 37-68. 
24 See for the modern era: Thomas Dunn and Douglas Holtz-Eakin, ‘Financial Capital, Human 
Capital, and the Transition to Self-Employment: Evidence from Intergenerational Links’, Journal 
of Labor Economics 18 (2000): 289 (table 2). 
10 
 
from outside the local community, or were by implication not directly related to 
the membership. Where the numbers fell between those values, we labelled the 
organisation or town as ‘neutral’. In order to offer some insight into absolute levels 
of openness, we also compare our results for the percentage of local immigrants 
among guild members with comparable percentages for the town’s population as 
a whole. This offers a stronger test of geographical openness, but is only possible 
for a few locations because of the lack of historical data on migration. 
 
The measures that we use to evaluate openness vary because the nature of guild 
barriers and guild records varied in cities across Europe. In places where 
citizenship was a prerequisite for joining a guild, access to urban economic 
activities might be limited by citizenship barriers.25 In others, the guild itself was 
the first hurdle that newcomers had to overcome, before becoming a citizen. In 
those towns citizenship was, in other words, a secondary effect of guild 
membership.26 These various institutional structures affect the sources that were 
created. Sometimes guilds recorded the place of origin of their members and 
apprentices, or if their parents were a member of the guild. In many other cases 
we have to gauge this from the fact that the entrance fees distinguished such 
categories as sons of masters, or local origin. Much of the data presented here was 
collected by the authors from primary sources, but other data stems from 
secondary materials. For more detail we refer readers to the data appendix. 
 
The data presented in this paper capture access to guilds at two different points. 
First, we can look directly at new entrants through the study of membership 
registers. In some cases at least, as well as allowing us to establish how many 
newly enrolled members were the sons of existing guild members, they provide 
information about their background, such as their place of origin. Rarely do we 
have both place of origin and family descent for the same guild. Second, we can 
                                                 
25 Piet Lourens and Jan Lucassen, ‘“Zunftlandschaften” in den Niederlanden und im benachbarten 
Deutschland’, in: W. Reininghaus (ed.), Zunftlandschaften in Deutschland und Niederlanden im 
Vergleich Schriften der Historischen Kommission für Westfalen, vol. 17 (Münster, 2000): 11-43. 
26 Patrick Wallis, ‘Apprenticeship and Training in Premodern England’, Journal of Economic 
History 68 (2008): 834. 
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gauge the characteristics of the membership through apprenticeship. Craft guilds 
usually required their members to spend several years learning the craft. Not all 
apprentices would become masters, but this was a stage which gave individuals 
the potential to become a master. Therefore, evidence about the characteristics of 
apprentices will be used to help flesh out our picture of the openness – or lack 
thereof – of the premodern urban and corporate system in Europe. One area where 
exclusionary mechanisms were also in force, was gender. This will be briefly 
discussed below, but is not the main point of this paper, which concentrates on kin 
and migrants. 
 
One final point needs to be underlined about our approach. By aggregating across 
towns and regions, we necessarily treat guilds as if they were homogeneous in this 
paper; this was not so. The members of Painters Guild in Haarlem, for example, 
had a debate during the 1630s and 1640s about the desirability of public auctions, 
raffles and lotteries, which, according to the guild officials, were ‘extremely 
damaging to, and disrespectful of, the artist and the art of painting’. As it was, 
guild members were themselves heavily involved in these illicit practices, and one 
of the offenders, former dean Frans de Grebber, actually claimed that such 
alternative outlets stimulated the demand for paintings, and could especially 
benefit young masters, who had still to establish a reputation.27 Access might 
likewise be a source of internal contestation as, for instance in tailors’ guilds with 
mixed gender membership. The Haarlem Tailors complained in 1707 that their 
trade was in trouble due to ‘the great number of seamstresses’, even though the 
seamstresses too were members of the guild. In Zutphen, in the eastern part of the 
Dutch Republic, male guild members introduced a rule that the number of 
                                                 
27 Hessel Miedema, De archiefbescheiden van het St. Lukasgilde te Haarlem 1497-1798, 2 vols 
(Alphen aan den Rijn, 1980): 89 (quote), 280-88; Neil de Marchi and Hans Van Miegroet, ‘Art, 
Value, and Market Practices in the Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century’, The Art Bulletin 76 
(1994): 458-60; also Christopher Friedrichs, ‘Capitalism, Mobility and Class Formation in the Early 
Modern German City’, Past and Present 69 (1975): 24-49; Robert Duplessis and Martha Howell, 
‘Reconsidering the Early Modern Urban Economy: The Cases of Leiden and Lille’, Past and Present 
94 (1982): 49-84; Hugo Soly, ‘The Political Economy of European Craft Guilds: Power Relations 
and Economic Strategies of Merchants and Master Artisans in the Medieval and Early Modern 
Textile Industries’, in: J. Lucassen, T. De Moor and J. L. van Zanden, eds., The Return of the Guilds, 
supplement 16 of International Review of Social History 53 (Cambridge, 2008): 45-71. 
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seamstresses should be limited to five.28 The data presented in this paper were 
the result of such struggles. 
 
 
Family Membership in Guilds 
During the second half of the eighteenth century, the membership of the Butchers’ 
Guild of ‘s-Hertogenbosch consisted entirely of people whose fathers, or fathers-in-
law, had been or still were members of the same guild. Remarkably, new members 
were admitted as toddlers, i.e. before they could possibly have completed an 
apprenticeship or otherwise demonstrated their skills. The reason behind this 
unusual state of affairs was the fixed number of places, in the forms of stalls, in 
the town’s meat hall, and the private ownership of those stalls.29 This allowed the 
guild to impose cartel conditions on the meat supply. However, precisely because 
the licensed butchers were in this position, the local authorities opened up the 
market to external suppliers in 1770, after the commander of the local garrison 
had complained that his soldiers were over-charged for their meat. Several new 
butchers then settled in ’s-Hertogenbosch, among them eight Jews, and started to 
sell meat outside the meat hall. In 1773 the guild filed a bitter complaint, about 
how these outsiders were able to charge lower prices because they sold poor-
quality product. The guild’s privileges were restored – on the condition that its 
members would restrain their prices.30 
 
This state of affairs in the Butchers’ Guild conforms with one popular image of the 
guilds: membership was routinely transferred from father to son, sometimes from 
                                                 
28 Panhuysen, Maatwerk: Kleermakers, naaisters, oudkleerkopers en de gilden (1500-1800) 
(Amsterdam, 2000), 216 (quote), 225; Deceulaer and Panhuysen, ‘Dressed to Work’; Crowston, 
Fabricating Women, ch. 5. 
29 In Paris, nearly half of all masters were sons of butchers: Sidney Watts, Meat Matters: Butchers, 
Politics, and Market Culture in Eighteenth-Century Paris (Rochester, 2006): 108; for Antwerp: 
Marc Jacobs, ‘De ambachten in Brabant en Mechelen (12de eeuw-1795)’, in: R. Van Uytven, C. 
Bruneel, H. Coppens, and B. Augustyn, eds., De gewestelijke en lokale overheidsinstellingen in 
Brabant en Mechelen tot 1795, vol. 2 (Brussels, 2000): 576. 
30 Erfgoed ’s-Hertogenbosch, Municipal Archive of the City 1262-1810, 394: 28 April 1773, fol. 174r-
177r and 395: 16 March 1774, fol. 101r-105v; also Maarten Prak, Republikeinse veelheid, 
democratische enkelvoud: sociale verandering in het Revolutietijdvak: 's-Hertogenbosch 1770-1820, 
(Nijmegen, 1999): 95-96, 100. 
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father to son-in-law or mother to daughter. Inheritable membership was therefore 
the most exclusive mechanism that privileged established masters and their off-
spring over outsiders, be they locals without previous connections to the guild, or 
immigrants. Many guilds actively shaped their rules to favour the children of 
members: for non-family members it was between 1.3 and 2.7 times more 
expensive to join the Antwerp Coopers’ Guild, depending on the fluctuating 
tariffs.31 Among Dutch Tailors’ Guilds the gap tended to be on the lower end of the 
Antwerp spectrum, but almost all of them discriminated against non-locals by 
charging them higher entrance dues; family members were treated even more 
favourably.32 The question is to what extent such preferential treatment for people 
with family ties to the guild actually shaped the composition of the membership. 
Or to phrase this in a different way: were the Butchers of ’s-Hertogenbosch typical 
for the state of affairs among guilds of the period?  
 
The two most spectacular pieces of evidence that support the thesis that guilds 
offered preferential treatment to relatives, come from Northern Europe. The first 
are the Butchers we already discussed, who happened to live in a region that is 
often portrayed as ‘liberal’, with ‘weak’ guilds, i.e. the Dutch Republic. The high 
percentage of sons in ’s-Hertogenbosch was closely followed by an almost equally 
extreme example, the town of Wildberg in southern Germany, where over ninety 
per cent of the weavers were following in their parents’ footsteps. Wildberg, located 
in the Swabian Black Forest, had a population of 1,500-2,000. Its economy was 
dominated by the textiles industry, which was embedded in a larger regional 
proto-industry, dominated by the Calwer Zeughandlungskompagnie, a merchant 
guild that controlled both the production and the export of the worsted industry of 
the Calw and Wildberg area.33 Together with Durlach and Hildesheim, Wildberg 
is one of the three smallest town in our data-set. 
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
                                                 
31 Bart Willems, ‘Loon naar werken? Sociale mobiliteit in het Antwerpse kuipersambacht (1585-
1793), Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis 82 (1999): 42. 
32 Panhuysen, Maatwerk, 297-99 
33 Ogilvie, State Corporatism, 3, 106-111, and passim. 
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Elsewhere, however, the shares of new masters who were sons or daughters of 
guild members were much more modest (figures 1a and 1b). The cities and towns 
with the next highest shares of new masters with kinship ties were Rouen (57 per 
cent), ’s-Hertogenbosch (40 per cent) and Hildesheim (35 per cent). In most places, 
shares were well below this level. Data from London about other family 
connections than direct descent also suggest that these will push up the share of 
new members who had a family connection with the guild, but by small amounts.34  
 
In England, masters’ children only rarely supplied more than twenty per cent of 
new masters. For cities in both France and the Low Countries, we found an 
unweighted average of 27 and 26 per cent in each area. Our evidence for both 
Spain and the Italian peninsula is on a smaller scale, with the latter only 
represented by the Turin Tailors’ Guild, but in both the share of masters’ sons 
among new masters was also low. Germany is the only country in which the 
average falls above a third, with 44 per cent of new masters across the guilds in 
our sample possessing a kinship tie. This figure is pulled up by Wildberg’s 
particularly high rates of insider recruitment, but as figure 1a shows, Germany 
did have a number of other guilds that drew heavily from members’ kin. Even 
excluding Wildberg, the average kin share is 36 per cent across the other eight 
German guilds in our sample.  
 
Although the spread of guilds, cities and countries in our sample does change over 
time, figure 1b shows that the averages in each of the half-century long periods we 
discuss fell within a narrow range, between 20 and 29 per cent.35 In short, despite 
changes in the composition of our sample – notably the inclusion of more 
observations from Germany in the eighteenth century – the majority of guilds 
remained open to entrants who lacked a kinship connection to an existing member. 
Most guilds took fewer than a third of new masters from among their existing 
members’ families. They were ‘open’, in short, in terms of our rule of thumb. 
                                                 
34 Leunig, Minns and Wallis, ‘Networks’, 423-425. 
35 T-tests of the equality of the mean share of kin in each period yield no significant difference 
between 1650-99 and the other three periods. The test results are as follows: 1650-99 and 1600-49: 
t=-0.44, N=19; 1650-99 and 1700-49: t=-0.39, N=34; 1650-99 and 1750-99: t=-0,40, N=34. 
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Masters’ children following their father into the same guild offer the most obvious 
indication of insider preference and guild openness, particularly in a patriarchal 
society such as early modern Europe. However, another kind of family connection 
also existed that offered a channel into a guild. In some cities and guilds, a man 
who married a master’s daughter or widow would gain admittance to a guild by 
virtue of their wife’s position. Data from eighteenth-century Hildesheim suggest 
that sons-in-law and widows’ second husbands could amount to a substantial 
number of new masters. In the four Hildesheim guilds for which evidence exists, 
sons-in-law made up 29 per cent of new masters, and another 32 per cent had 
married the daughter or widow of a master.36 Taken together with the 35 per cent 
of masters who were sons, even if son masters’ sons married other master’s 
daughters then this level of entry by marriage meant that entrants with a direct 
or affinal kin tie to existing masters surely constituted the majority of new guild 
members in this community – and masters’ daughters could form a large share of 
the next generation of masters’ wives.  
 
It is not clear that we should generalize from Hildesheim, however. Marriage to a 
master’s daughter or widow did not always bring guild privileges: this right 
existed in many centres in the German lands, France and the Southern 
Netherlands, but was rare in England and the Northern Netherlands. Even where 
it did exist, if we assume that the number of masters’ daughters roughly equalled 
the number of masters’ sons, then the evidence in figure 1 suggests that the total 
share of new masters with a kinship tie would still only be around half of new 
entrants in most cities and guilds that we observe. Most importantly, we need to 
ask if the possibility for mastership to be attained by marriage actually reinforced 
guild closure, or if it was simply a further way for outsiders to become guild 
members. To be sure, they might need the consent of a master to contract the 
marriage in question, but it is a substantial leap to imagine that masters are – in 
these cases – filtering the pool of potential husbands for their daughters with the 
aim of protecting the composition of their guild, as we would have to assume if this 
                                                 
36 Calculated from Karl H. Kaufhold, Das Handwerk der Stadt Hildesheim im 18. Jahrhundert 
Göttinger Beiträge zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte vol. 5 (Göttingen, 1980): 254 (table 3b). 
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was to be seen as an extension, not a loophole, in the barriers around Europe’s 
guilds.  
 
Finally, we need to ask if masters who entered guilds via inheritance formed a 
privileged cohort. Perhaps this group had an importance and access to authority 
that exceeded their numerical share. On the one hand, there are reasons to assume 
that sons of masters were more likely to complete their apprenticeship.37 On the 
other hand, an investigation of the board members of eighteenth-century tailors’ 
guilds in the Dutch Republic does not give any indication that sons of masters 
were more likely to be elected than others. In Amsterdam, many deans were first-
generation immigrants. In the small town of Elburg they had to introduce a rule 
that nobody could refuse to accept the position of dean, if elected by the 
membership, suggesting it was as much a burden as an honour to be selected for 
such an influential post.38 
 
The evidence as it currently stands shows that only in exceptional circumstances 
were guilds dominated by dynasties of masters who passed on their businesses 
from one generation to the next. The normal situation was that a minority, often 
quite a small minority, of masters had entered the guild as the direct successor of 
their father (or mother). Endogamy among guild members was unusual.39 
Financial and other barriers were no doubt advantageous to relatives of 
established masters, but generally they did not prevent non-kin membership. 
 
 
Migrants in Guilds 
In January 1757 the journeyman stonemason Franz Strickner filed a petition with 
the council of Vienna, asking to be confirmed in his mastership. Strickner, who 
                                                 
37 Chris Minns, and Patrick Wallis, ‘Rules and Reality: Quantifying the Practice of Apprenticeship 
in Early Modern England’, Economic History Review 65 (2012): 573. 
38 Panhuysen, Maatwerk, 52-60. 
39 Michael Mitterauer, ‘Zur familienbetrieblichen Struktur im zünftischen Handwerk’, in: H. 
Knittler, ed., Wirtschafts- und sozialhistorische Beiträge: Festschrift für Alfred Hoffmann zum 75. 
Geburtstag (Munich, 1979): 190-219; Simona Cerutti, La ville et les métiers: Naissance d’un langage 
corporatif (Turin, XVIIe-XVIIIe siècle) (Paris, 1990), 167; Farr, Artisans in Europe, 245-46; Kluge, 
Die Zünfte, 244; Leunig, Minns and Wallis, ‘Networks’, 425. 
17 
 
originated from the small border town of Eggenburg to the north-west of Vienna, 
had taken over the workshop of the Viennese master Matthias Winkler, on the 
condition that he would look after Winkler’s widow and marry his granddaughter. 
All looked set for a successful career, but the Guild refused to examine his 
masterpiece, and therefore prevented his admission to the Guild. According to the 
Guild’s counter petition, the granddaughter was long dead, and the widow was 
rich enough to take care of herself. Instead of the outsider Strickner, the Guild 
had a strong preference for the ‘citizen and master’s son’ Carl Schunko, whose 
father had already tried to persuade Winkler’s widow to allow Carl to take over 
the workshop.40  
 
The records do not tell who was ultimately victorious in this conflict about 
masterships, but the story does highlight how contentious access to the guilds 
could become. It also illustrates one common suspicion about guilds: that they had 
an innate tendency to prevent people from other places from joining their ranks, 
preferring to draw their membership from the familiar ranks of locals instead of 
freshly-arrived outsiders. We have no way of knowing the strength of guild 
officials’ preferences, but we can identify the results of any actions they took by 
again looking at the distribution of insiders and outsiders, this time comparing 
the shares of locals and migrants among new masters. The share of new masters 
who were locals, reported by period, produces the results presented in figure 2. 
 
[Figure 2 around here] 
 
The range of values for guilds is much wider on this geographical measure of 
openness than on the kinship measure. Many more guilds are positioned in the 
middle of the range, and far fewer are hovering close to zero than in figure 1. Of 
course, guilds that recruited only a handful of locals might be thought of as 
excessively open, implying either a particularly unappealing occupation or 
                                                 
40 Thomas Buchner, Möglichkeiten von Zunft: Wiener und Amsterdamer Zünfte im Vergleich (17. 




possibly their capture by a specific group of migrants. In general, most guilds (85 
per cent) fell into either our open or neutral categories, with a minority being 
closed. Had we dropped the ‘neutral’ category and split the data into just open and 
closed along the 50 per cent divide, 49 out of 79, or 62 per cent, would have been 
classified as open.  
 
Most of our evidence on the geographical origins of masters comes from England, 
especially London, and German Europe. When guilds are presented by country, as 
in figure 2a, we observe a pattern that is the opposite of what much of the 
literature might lead one to expect, with guilds in the Low Countries recruiting 
the highest share of masters from locals (58 per cent), followed by English guilds 
(45 per cent) and finally German guilds (38 per cent).41 There is no sign on this 
measure that German guilds were systematically more closed than those in 
England or the Netherlands, although the sample size for the latter is modest. 
This is a striking contrast to what we saw in our earlier discussion of the share of 
new masters with kin ties, where German guilds looked more closed than those 
elsewhere. Behind this contrast is the substantial increase in the size of our 
German guild sample: we have information about the share of locals among new 
masters for 33 German guilds, compared to the nine discussed earlier. It seems 
likely that this migration-based measure thus better reflects the breadth of guild 
practices across Germany. At the very least, we can be sure that a great deal of 
heterogeneity existed within countries and regions, particularly in the German 
lands, as well as between guilds within the same city.  
 
Figure 2b reports the share of locals by half century. Shifting composition aside, 
it suggests that guilds were recruiting more new masters locally as time passed. 
The trend is not very strong, and in all periods a number of guilds remained ‘open’. 
However, there does appear to be a drift towards closure over these two 
                                                 
41 The averages reported are calculated from the average share of locals among masters by guild 
for the full period; where guilds are observed for more than one period we use an unweighted 
average of the share of locals in all periods. 
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centuries.42 When we look at patterns of recruitment within guilds over time, we 
see further indications of this: in London, where we have the strongest sequential 
series of evidence, the share of new masters who came from the city more than 
doubled from 28 to 59 per cent between the first half of the seventeenth century 
and the second half of the eighteenth century. Gloucester, similarly, saw the share 
of locals almost double from 44 to 78 per cent between 1600-49 and 1700-49. This 
trend was not universal, though. Over the same two hundred years, in Madrid the 
share of locals remained essentially stable, at around 30 per cent, while in Bristol 
the share only rose gently from 42 to 49 per cent from 1650-99 to 1750-99.  
 
In general, most guilds encompassed a substantial share of migrants among their 
membership. Few European guilds were dominated by locals. On this measure of 
openness, although insiders were more numerous than in the kinship measure, 
guilds still largely appear to have been open to outsiders, although there are signs 




Access to Apprenticeship 
Thomas Gent was born in Ireland, probably in 1693. He started an apprenticeship 
as a printer in Dublin, but ran away to England in 1710. The published version of 
his autobiography actually starts with Gent being seasick on the ship that took 
him across. Finding no printing press in Chester, his first port of call, he travelled 
on to London, where he continued to learn his trade. In 1713 Gent completed the 
seven years of training that was required under English law from every master 
artisan. At the end of his time, his master Midwinter offered Gent hospitality and 
protection: ‘I do not prefer my interest to your good; and though you came [as] an 
almost stranger to me, God forbid that I should send you as such abroad.’ He 
helped secure Gent some odd jobs and finally a place as a journeyman-printer in 
                                                 
42 Tests of the equality of the mean share of locals in each period show that only 1600-49 was 
significantly different from the other three periods. The test results are as follows: 1650-99 and 




York. Subsequently, Gent returned to London and his former master, and in 1717 
entered the Stationers Company, the guild of London booksellers.43 
 
Once again the question is: was Gent’s experience as a migrant able to find an 
apprenticeship in a distant city typical? The volume of available evidence for 
apprentices is smaller than for masters, as record survival is more limited. 
Moreover, in many places aside from England, masters’ own sons did not need to 
be formally registered as apprentices if they were being trained at home. In those 
guilds, apprentices were by definition outsiders on one of our measures. 
Nonetheless, we possess sufficient evidence from a range of guilds to illustrate 
some general patterns. 
 
[Figure 3 around here] 
 
In figure 3, we report the average shares of locals and kin among apprentices by 
country and half century. The figure points to a marked contrast between our two 
measures of openness that echoes the differences seen in the sample of masters. 
On the one hand, guilds were highly varied in the share of locals that they 
recruited as apprentices. On the other, the share of kin found among apprentices 
was relatively similar – and much lower. 
 
The sample size beneath the country averages is not large, as figure 3a shows, but 
even so there is at least some suggestion that the Low Countries was less open by 
this measure than other parts of Europe, while guilds in England, France and 
Spain look more similar to each other.44 If we look instead at city-level averages, 
                                                 
43 Thomas Gent, The Life of mr. Thomas Gent, Printer of York (London, 1832): 11-12 (quote), 66-
67; see also Ian Anders Gadd, ‘The Stationers’ Company in England before 1710’, in: I. Alexander 
and H.T. Gómez-Arostegui, eds., Research Handbook on the History of Copyright Law. Research 
handbooks in intellectual property (Cheltenham, 2016) : 81-95. 
44 Statistical interpretations are difficult due to small sample sizes, but t-tests of the equality of 
means of the local master shares between England, the Low Countries, and Latin Europe (France 
and Spain combined) show that only differences in the first pair are close to statistical significance. 
The results of these tests are as follows: England against Low Countries: t = -1.93, N=16; England 
against Latin Europe: t = 0.15, N=19. 
44 T-tests of the equality of means of the kin master shares between England, the Low Countries, 
and Latin Europe (France and Spain combined) show no significant differences between groups. 
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we gain a greater sense of the scale and factors that lay behind these differences. 
Our sample includes guilds from sixteen cities. In eleven of these, less than half of 
apprentices were locals: Liverpool, booming in the early eighteenth century, has 
the lowest share with just 12 per cent, followed by the expanding Spanish capital, 
Madrid (27 per cent), France’s manufacturing powerhouse Lyon (28 per cent) and 
– somewhat unexpectedly – the provincial English town of Lincoln (35 per cent). 
The cities where local youths dominated apprenticeships by contrast were to a 
large extent united by facing periods of economic decline in the seventeenth or 
eighteenth centuries: Antwerp (81 per cent), Leiden (70 per cent) and Amsterdam 
(67 per cent). Only Paris (72 per cent) and Bristol (53 per cent) combined growth 
and high shares of locals among apprentices. Kin shares suggest a similar 
conclusion, with sons and daughters particularly rare in thriving London (four per 
cent), and exploding Liverpool (two per cent) compared to the small town of Boston 
(36 per cent). 
 
Compared to the shares of locals among new masters, there is much less of a sense 
of increasing closure in the apprentice data. Across the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, the overall average of locals among apprentices in the guilds 
in our sample was broadly stable, though clearly volatile, with an average of just 
below half of apprentices coming from within the town or city where they trained. 
And, as the distribution in figure 3c suggests, there was consistently a wide range 
between guilds.  
 
It is instructive to compare the overall share of locals among apprentices with that 
among new masters, albeit that the samples cover slightly different cities and 
guilds. The share of locals was similar in both samples: the average share of locals 
among new masters was 44 per cent, just one percentage point from the 45 per 
cent share of locals among apprentices. In both cases, around 80 per cent of guilds 
fell into either the open or neutral category: if the two are divided down the middle, 
65% of guilds are open when measured by the share of locals among apprentices, 
                                                 
The results of these tests are as follows: England against Low Countries: t = -0.23, N=17; England 
against Latin Europe: t = -1.21, N=14. 
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compared to 62% of guilds that are open when measured by the share of locals 
among new masters. Even though the margins are small, Europe’s guilds appear 
to have generally tended to be ‘open’ to apprentices from outside as they were to 
new masters.  
 
Access to apprenticeship was relatively open to outsiders in most European guilds. 
Migrants supplied upwards of half of all apprentices in most localities. The great 
majority of locals were not the children of masters, albeit that for most guilds we 
do not observe masters’ children at all.  
 
 
Explanations for Guild Openness 
To what extent does the pattern of guild openness that we observe here support 
the four theses that exist to explain when and why guilds raised barriers to entry: 
divergent regional traditions; their power over local government; the size of the 
community; and change over time?  
 
First, we have to reject the view that guilds in England and the Dutch Republic 
were somehow more liberal because of regional differences in political economy 
and institutions. As figures 1 to 3 have consistently shown, we can observe guilds 
in Spain and Italy that are as open as any in the Netherlands or England. London’s 
guilds very much resemble those in Berlin and Vienna; only Paris looks more 
closed. Wildberg was, it seems, not typical for the German world, where other 
towns and cities in our sample are closer in character to those found elsewhere in 
Europe, with a mixture of open, closed and neutral guilds. Remarkably, it is the 
Low Countries that turns out to have the highest percentage of exclusive guilds 
judged by openness to new masters, with one in four closed, whilst France, Italy 
and Spain together have the most open guilds on this measure. Few of these 
differences, however, were statistically meaningful. Statistical tests of the 
equality of the mean share of locals among masters between England and the 
three comparison regions of Germany, the Low Countries and Latin Europe (the 
combination of France, Italy and Spain) fail to reject the hypothesis that share of 
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locals were equal at the five percent level of significance.45 Only for kin shares, 
where the exceptional nature of Wildberg plays an important role, do we find a 
significant difference between Germany and England.46 If we calculate the 
country-level averages for openness to migrant apprentices, the Low Countries 
again has the highest share of locals (63 per cent). Conversely, there is little to 
distinguish France (43 per cent), England (39 per cent) and Spain (35 per cent).47  
 
The argument that the local political ‘regime’ might have impacted on the ability 
of guilds to close their ranks is in one way difficult to evaluate: only a minority of 
the towns in our dataset actually had governments in which guilds held much 
power.48 Most guilds were politically weak, in formal terms at least. If we compare 
levels of openness between towns where guilds did and did not have some formal 
power, we find that locals made up 41 per cent of new masters in towns where 
guilds had power, compared to 39 per cent where they did not; the split if we look 
at kinship is 39 per cent where guilds had power against 25 per cent where guilds 
did not. The difference in guild openness between the two types of community is 
not statistically significant at conventional levels on either measure.49 In fact, 
there is no consistent pattern among towns that share a political regime: whether 
or not guilds were in government, they could fit into almost any point along the 
range from very open to very closed. The same holds true for apprentices, where 
the politically influential guilds of London were largely open to migrant youths, 
while in Amsterdam guilds were not officially involved in politics and yet it was 
still a relatively closed city in these terms. Guild political influence did not 
automatically translate into closed apprenticeships or closed masterships. 
 
                                                 
45 The values of the test statistics for equality of the share of local masters are as follows: England 
against Germany, t = 1.67, N=68; England against the Low Countries, t = -1.31, N=43, England 
against Latin Europe, t =1.80, N=38. 
46 The values of the test statistics for equality of the share of masters who were kin are as follows: 
England against Germany, t = -4.96, N=45; England against the Low Countries, t = -1.61, N=35, 
England against Latin Europe, t = -1.49, N=39. 
47 The number of cities in the sample is small: England 8; France 2; Low Countries 4; Spain 2. 
48 Towns where guilds had government power are: Antwerp, Brussels, Ghent, Hildesheim, London. 
49 Locals: student’s t-test, N=34, t = -0.28; Kin, N=30, t = 1.45. This calculation is based on each 
guild contributing a single average figure for local or kin across all periods on our data. 
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We also tried to map our results against the related phenomenon of guild 
autonomy. Stasavage claims that ‘autonomous’ towns in the long run suffer from 
the tendency of their guilds to become increasingly closed, and thus stifle the local 
economy.50 Unfortunately, all our towns, apart from Amsterdam, are in the non-
autonomous group and even the Amsterdam classification as autonomous can be 
questioned. If Stasavage is correct then this may explain why we find most guilds 
to be relatively open. That said, we do see a lot of variation in openness among 
these ‘non-autonomous’ towns, suggesting that autonomy may offer at best a 
partial explanation for guilds’ behaviour. 
 
If local power and regional cultures and institutional differences cannot explain 
guild openness, is town size a good predictor? It is by no means perfect, but figures 
4a and 4b, which trace the relationship between our two openness measures for 
masters and urban population, suggest that it does a better job than the other 
theories. There is a clear drift from closed to open as we move from smaller to 
larger towns when we plot openness to masters against population, and simple 
bivariate regressions of the share of local or kin masters against the log of city 
population yield statistically significant negative coefficients.51 Not all guilds fit 
the pattern; we still find two closed guilds in the largest category, but otherwise 
the match is good for this group. In a way, this should not come as a surprise, 
because large towns simply required large numbers of immigrants to grow to the 
size they had attained.52 We have too few cities in the apprentice sample to 
identify a meaningful relationship between openness and population. However, 
the apprentice sample does point to a direct link between openness and the 
economic cycle: unsurprisingly, it was Europe’s fastest-growing centres that pulled 
in larger shares of outside youths among their apprentices. 
 
                                                 
50 Stasavage, ‘Was Weber Right?’, 353; we thank the author for making his data available to us.. 
51 A regression of kin master share against the log of population yields the following coefficients (t-
statistics in parentheses): local = 101.1 (7.46) – 6.53 * ln(population) (-5.50), N=68, R-square = 0.31. 
The result of a regression of local master share against the log of population is local = 83.2 (6.49) – 
3.51 * ln(population) (-3.13), N=79, R-square = 0.11. Further details are available on request. 
52 For England, see Jeffrey G. Williamson, Coping with City Growth during the British industrial 
revolution (Cambridge, 1990): 26.  
25 
 
[Figure 4 around here] 
 
As a large number of Europe’s guilds were active in medium and small-sized 
towns, this result suggests that the pessimists have a strong argument: it is 
possible that the majority of guilds were closed, because they were located in small 
towns. However, because small towns also had guilds with small memberships, it 
is also possible that most masters were members of open guilds. In the 
Netherlands in 1795, almost 30 per cent of the population lived in cities of 10,000 
and over, and only 12 per cent more in cities below the 10,000 mark. In England 
and Wales (1801) the percentages were 20 and 11 respectively. Large centres with 
more open guilds thus reflect the experience of the most substantial part of the 
population in these two countries. In Prussia (1801) only 8 per cent lived in large 
towns, but 14 per cent in small towns; in the German territories on the left bank 
of the Rhine (1806) the percentages were 7 and 10.53 This suggests that the ‘small 
town’ numbers in table 4 better capture the German situation, whilst the ‘large 
town’ numbers are more representative for the Low Countries and England. 
 
For the apprentices, all theories are more difficult to test because of the small 
number of towns and their uneven distribution. This applies especially to the 
theories about the impact of political influence and state-formation. The data on 
apprentices confirms our observation for the masters that the Low Countries had 
relatively closed guilds, whereas England, France and Spain were much more 
open. There is no indication of openness increasing or decreasing over time. For 
apprentices, town size is not a good predictor of openness: all small towns are 
located in England, so that is not very helpful, but among the large towns we find 
examples of both open (London, Madrid) and closed (Amsterdam, Antwerp, Paris) 
guilds. 
 
To sum up, our data provide clear evidence that numerous guilds allowed large 
numbers of apprentices who were neither born locally nor related to guild 
members to nonetheless access the membership. In terms of regional distribution 
                                                 
53 Jan de Vries, European Urbanization 1500-1800 (London, 1984): 59. 
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the Low Countries’ guilds were closed compared to other regions of Europe, 
contrary to their reputation of early economic liberalism. There is some evidence 
of a decrease in openness across time among the masters, but not among the 
apprentices. 
 
Are our results an artefact of the period for which we have been able to uncover 
evidence about these two measures of guild openness? The waxing and waning of 
guilds has long been debated, and one obvious objection to deriving any broad 
conclusion about the nature of Europe’s guilds from their behaviour in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is that these periods came at the twilight of 
this type of economic institution. Possibly guilds in their medieval heyday were 
much more closed. 
 
Historians’ ideas on when guilds were strongest have been complicated in recent 
years by evidence that the numbers of guild foundations was increasing into the 
early modern period in the Netherlands and Italy.54 Even in countries such as 
England – once the paradigmatic case of guild decline – some guilds remained 
active into the late eighteenth century.55 Still, guilds were, arguably, losing power 
as time went on, because the growth of markets and states decreased the need and 
scope for such producers’ organisations. One might expect greater openness to be 
the result. Yet if anything, our data suggest that guilds were becoming marginally 
less open over time (figure 1). The share of guilds falling into our ‘open’ category 
when measured by kinship falls from 80 per cent to 64 per cent between the early 
seventeenth and later eighteenth centuries. The share of ‘open’ guilds measured 
by migration falls from 50 per cent to 20 per cent over the same period – although 
it is truer to talk of a fluctuation here with the share open in the early eighteenth 
century at 41 per cent, thanks to the inclusion of a pool of German guilds. At the 
same time, as we discussed earlier, we see a decrease of openness in a number of 
                                                 
54 Bert De Munck, Piet Lourens and Jan Lucassen, ‘The establishment and distribution of craft 
guilds in the Low Countries, 1000-1800’, Prak, Lis, Lucassen and Soly, eds., Craft Guilds in the 
Early Modern Low Countries, 37 (tab. 2.1); Luca Mocarelli, ‘Guilds Reappraised: Italy in the Early 
Modern Period’, in:  Lucassen, De Moor and Van Zanden, eds., The Return of the Guilds, 164 (fig. 
1). 
55 Berlin, ‘Guilds in Decline?’. 
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guilds for which we have longer series of evidence across multiple sub-periods. 
Notably, this is a strong pattern in most London guilds, which were supposed to 
have become so weak in the same period. If London’s guilds were becoming 
irrelevant in the eighteenth century, they were doing so among friends. 
 
There is too little data from the fifteenth and sixteenth century to create a clear 
story about that earlier period. What we have uncovered does not suggest a sharp 
break in practices between late medieval and early modern guilds. In the five 
quarter-centuries between 1375 and 1500 the percentage of masters’ sons 
registered by the coopers’ guild in late medieval Bruges fluctuated between 11 and 
31. The weighted average came to 22 per cent, or approximately one in five.56 In 
sixteenth-century Ghent, the percentages were much higher than that and the 
highest values were found for the periods when the guilds were in power.57 
 
Marriage contracts from sixteenth-century Aix-en-Provence suggest generally 
more open guilds: none of the twenty-seven marriage contracts for Tailors reports 
a tailor as the father of the groom. A similar pattern was found among the Carders, 
Tanners, and Shoemakers of Aix. Only one out of eighteen Tanners was a tanner’s 
son. The Weavers, on the other hand, tended to follow their fathers’ profession and 
also frequently married weavers’ daughters or women who were otherwise 
connected to the weaving community. This happened rarely in the more open 
guilds. For example, only three out of 36 Shoemakers married a daughter or sister 
of another shoemaker.58 These examples are comparable to those we observed for 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and do not suggest a clear trend towards 
or away from greater openness. 
 
 
                                                 
56 Peter Stabel, ‘Social Mobility and Apprenticeship in late Medieval Flanders’, in: Bert De Munck, 
Steven L. Kaplan and Hugo Soly, eds., Learning on the Shop Floor: Historical Perspectives on 
Apprenticeship (Oxford, 2007): 170. 
57 Dambruyne, ‘Guilds’, 51 
58 Claire Dolan, ‘The Artisans of Aix-en-Provence in the Sixteenth Century: A Micro-Analysis of 
Social Relationships’, in: Philip Benedict, ed., Cities and Social Change in Early Modern France 




Our discussion of guilds has concentrated on their relative position within a range 
of peers spread loosely from open to closed, as defined by our two measures of 
openness. For a few places we can go somewhat further, and compare the openness 
of guilds to that of the town or city in general, by considering the percentage of 
migrants in the total population. There are clearly endogeneity issues here: if 
guilds dominated the local economy, they may have influenced migration into the 
town as a whole.  
 
Evidence about towns in Holland is least likely to suffer from this problem: most 
welcomed foreigners as a policy, especially during the seventeenth century.59 On 
this basis, we could judge the Rotterdam Goldsmiths (77 per cent local), the Delft 
Painters (70 per cent local) or the Haarlem Dyers (83 per cent local) to be closed 
guilds, displaying substantially higher percentages of locals than each city’s 
population (45, 40 and 52 per cent respectively). The Amsterdam Tailors, on the 
other hand, had fewer locals in their ranks (23 per cent) than we would expect on 
the basis of their 47 per cent share of the town’s population. Other data about the 
Amsterdam population in the seventeenth century, which includes masters as well 
as journeymen, demonstrates huge variations in the share of locals versus 
immigrants. If we look only at incorporated trades, we find the Bakers were 
dominated by (German) immigrants, whilst the Shipwrights were two-thirds 
locals.60 Similarly, in Madrid, where immigrants supplied between 53 and 70 per 
cent of the population between the mid-seventeenth and mid-eighteenth century, 
two thirds of the city’s guilds’ memberships also came from outside the city.61  
 
In early seventeenth-century London, 23 per cent of women were locals compared 
to 28 per cent of new masters; in the second half of the century, the shares of locals 
                                                 
59 Jan Lucassen, ‘Holland, een open gewest: immigratie en bevolkingsontwikkeling’, in: Timo de 
Nijs and Eelco Beukers, eds., Geschiedenis van Holland, vol. ii: 1572-1795 (Hilversum 2002): 207-
10. 
60 Erika Kuijpers, Migrantenstad: Immigratie en sociale verhoudingen in 17e-eeuws Amsterdam 
(Hilversum. 2005): ch. 6 and p. 406. 
61 María F. Carbajo Isla, La población de Madrid desde finales del siglo XVI hasta mediados del 
XIX (Madrid, 1987): 118-25; we owe this reference to José Nieto. 
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had risen to 31 per cent and 37 per cent, respectively.62 Masters appear more local 
than the population as a whole. Note, however, that these unweighted averages 
are made up of guilds that individually spanned the share of women. Larger guilds 
such as the Clothworkers (18 per cent local) were markedly more open than 
smaller ones such as the Apothecaries (26 per cent) and Stationers (34 per cent). 
Weighted for size, 23 and 34 per cent of masters were locals, little different to the 
city’s women.  
 
Despite major variations between guilds and cities, this exercise suggests that 
most guilds accepted a similar share of foreigners as towns did as a whole. 
 
 
Guilds and Gender 
One very large exception to this general picture of mostly open guilds needs to be 
underlined: there can be no doubt that the great majority of guild members were 
men. This was at least partly the result of the deliberate exclusion of females. 
Especially in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as a result of both the 
reinforcement of patriarchy during the Reformation and changes in the labour 
market, some guilds included explicit clauses to this effect in their rule books.63 In 
many more places, the gender imbalance was simply the result of a shared bias 
among the membership. The precise contribution of guild policies – explicit or 
implicit – is difficult to measure, because the distribution across the workforce 
would not be equal even if there had been no obstacles, and because guild policies 
were embedded in broader societal patterns.64 
 
                                                 
62 Eleanor Hubbard, City Women: Money, Sex and the Social Order in Early Modern London 
(Oxford, 2014): 20. 
63 From a more substantial literature, see Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks, ‘Guilds, Male Bonding and 
Women’s Work in Early Modern Germany’, Gender and History 1 (1989): 125-37, Kluge, Zünfte, 
132-40, and Clare Haru Crowston, ‘Women, Gender and Guilds in Early Modern Europe: An 
Overview of Recent Research’, in: Lucassen, De Moor, and Van Zanden, eds., The Return of the 
Guilds, 19-44. 
64 Elise van Nederveen Meerkerk, De draad in eigen handen: vrouwen en loonarbeid in de 
Nederlandse textielnijverheid, 1581-1810 (Amsterdam, 2007): 162-63. 
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Some crafts, however, give us a better sense of the relationship between guild 
control and gender discrimination. The production of clothes was generally 
separated by gender: men were dressed by male tailors, women by female 
seamstresses who also made children’s clothing. Women’s access to the clothing 
trades, which were usually incorporated, was formatted in three distinct ways: 
subservience in male-dominated Tailors’ Guilds, quasi-independence within 
Tailors’ Guilds, or independent Seamstresses’ Guilds. One such independent guild 
was established in Paris in 1675 and it quickly became the largest guild in the 
city, and home to the single largest group of apprentices. In Rouen, a similar guild 
was set up, but in Caen, Aix-en-Provence, and Marseille seamstresses remained 
subordinate members of the Tailors’ Guild.65 Similar variations occurred in the 
Low Countries. In the Northern Netherlands, seamstresses found it much easier 
to join guilds than in the South, where guilds actively excluded women. As a result, 
the tailoring trade remained a male preserve in the South, where the ratio of 
tailors versus seamstresses was three or four to one in the smaller centres. In the 
larger centres in the Low Countries, such as Antwerp, Amsterdam and Brussels, 
the numbers of males and females were neatly balanced in the clothing trade, 
irrespective of the fact that in the latter city guilds had a direct role in local 




How exclusive were guilds? Measured by the share of migrants among masters 
and apprentices, most guilds were ‘open’ or ‘neutral’ in our categorisation. Only 
one in five guilds were closed, and hence a clear minority. When we consider the 
share of masters with family ties most guilds also appear to have been on open; 
only one out of seven of the observations of the guilds investigated here, half or 
more of the members had been recruited among the masters’ children. In forty per 
cent of guilds, fewer than one in five new members were the sons or daughters of 
another guild member. Given the fact that the parents could also have transferred 
                                                 
65 Crowston, Fabricating Women, ch. 4, p. 402. 
66 Deceulaer and Panhuysen, ‘Dressed’, esp. 139 (tab. 5.1). 
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the property of a workshop and its equipment to their children, it is especially 
striking that this was a relatively unusual way to become a master. 
 
Our results suggest that blanket references to guild exclusiveness are misleading 
in many cases. For both apprentices and masters, entry barriers did not result in 
the membership being drawn from a narrow range of social or geographical 
backgrounds. No doubt all kinds of obstacles stood in the way of joining the guilds, 
but those obstacles proved surmountable for large numbers of ‘outsiders’. In many 
places, so-called guild monopolies were accessible to such a wide range of people 
that the word loses its explanatory value; whatever rents they produced were 
shared among a pool of masters who were mostly recruited from outside the guild 
and its immediate community. 
 
Of the four theses that have been used to explain guild exclusiveness, we found 
support for only one. The size of towns was a reasonable predictor of guild 
openness. Most open guilds were found in larger communities, whereas small 
communities tended to have more closed guilds. The caveat is that both our 
smallest towns were located in Germany. We can safely say that among our data, 
Ogilvie’s results for Wildberg are in every respect among the most extreme cases 
and therefore cannot be considered as representative until further evidence has 
been uncovered. Both commonplaces about regional differences across Europe and 
between political regimes proved to be a poor predictor of guild openness, and 
where indications were found of a decrease of openness, the trend was not very 
strong. 
 
Why were Europe’s guilds more open than expected? Set against the potential 
economic rents that masters might accrue from closure were a number of good 
reasons for guilds and urban authorities in premodern societies to be wary of 
closing their communities to outsiders. Amongst these, two stand out in particular. 
One is that urban communities found it very difficult to reproduce themselves 
demographically. To maintain the size of the local population, not to mention 
fuelling growth, an influx of immigrants was simply necessary. There is an 
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interesting parallel here with modern welfare states.67 The second is that all these 
communities, but especially the larger ones, found it difficult to consistently police 
the boundaries of their communities. Exclusion also threatened to be counter-
productive. Exclusionary policies might stimulate ‘illicit’ entrepreneurs to set up 
business outside the control of the guild, for example in the suburbs or the adjacent 
countryside.68 The authorities were equally ambivalent: they wanted strong guilds 
to help them impose political and social control, but they also feared the guilds as 
potential platforms for revolutionary activities.69 
 
An instructive parallel is offered by immigration policies in the twentieth century. 
Nation states have the capacity to use citizenship to bar prospective migrants from 
entering their labour markets. The policies that states follow in practice have 
varied significantly, but the net effect has been to provide very substantial rents 
to the citizens of the developed world, if measured by unskilled wage 
differentials.70 This is reflected in much of the debate surrounding the 
introduction of restrictive immigration policies in the United States prior to 1917; 
attention was focused squarely on the potential effects of international population 
inflows on the high wages received by American workers.71 This offers a modern 
benchmark for the capacity of institutions to reward insiders, and one that is, we 
would suggest, indicative of far larger labour market distortions than existed 
under the guild regime in the early modern world. 
 
                                                 
67 Peter Lindert, Growing Public: Social Spending and Economic Growth Since the Eighteenth 
Century vol 1: The Story (Cambridge, 2004): 205-07. 
68 Kaplan, ‘Les corporations’. 
69 Susan Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe 900-1300 (Oxford, 1997, 2nd. 
ed.): 68, 75; Soly, ‘Political Economy’. 
70 Bob Hamilton and John Whalley, ‘Efficiency and Distributional Implications of Global 
Restrictions on Labour Mobility: Calculations and Policy Implications’, Journal of Development 
Economics 14 (1984): 61-75, estimate that abolishing all restriction on international labour 
migration would increase world GDP per capita in the 1980s by approximately 150 percent. 






Figure 1 Share of kin among new masters in European guilds 
1a: Kinship rates by country 
 
1b: Kinship rates by period  
  
 
Note: figure 1a reports the unweighted average share of new masters who have a recorded kin tie 
to an existing guild member for each guild across all periods in our sample; each guild is thus 
represented by a single observation reported by country. Figure 1b reports the share for individual 
guilds by period; each guild can appear once in any period. Both figures show each guild as a single 





Figure 2 Share of locals among new masters in European guilds 
2a: Local shares by country  
 
2b: Local shares by period  
 
 
Note: figure 2a reports the unweighted average share of new masters who were local to a town or 
city for each guild across all periods in our sample; each guild is thus represented by a single 
observation reported by country. Figure 2b reports the share for individual guilds by period; each 
guild can appear once in any period. Both figures show each guild as a single point, with the mean 









Note: figure 3a and 3b reports the unweighted average share of apprentices who were local to a 
town or city for each guild across all periods in our sample; each guild is thus represented by a 
single observation reported by country. Figure 3c and 3d reports the share for individual guilds by 
period; each guild can appear once in any period. Both figures show each guild as a single point, 




Figure 4: Guild openness related to town size in Europe 
4a: Local master shares against city population (log scale) 
 
4b: Kin master shares against city population 
 
  
Note: figure 4 reports the unweighted average share of guild openness as reported in figures 1 and 
2 (shares of locals) across all periods in our sample; each guild is thus represented by a single 




Data Appendix  
 
The appendix lists for each town for which we have data  
- Name of guild 
- Years of observation: where the dates cover more than one half century we 
have counted them in both half centuries; when the data relate to less than 
one half century but straddle two half centuries they have been allotted to 
the half century with which there is the biggest overlap 
- Local: percentage of masters/apprentices from the town itself 
- Kin: percentage of masters/apprentices whose parents were members of the 
same guild 
 
Masters & Freemen 




(%)  N  
      
England      
Bristol*72 All 1650-99 42  
       
7,639  
  1700-49 45  11,249 
  1750-99 49  
       
9,902  
Gloucester*73 All 1600-49 44  
            
64  
  1650-99 61  
          
491  
  1700-49 78  
          
726  
Lincoln*74 All 1650-99 68  
          
750  
  1700-49 67  
          
813  
  1750-99 58  
          
806  
                                                 
72 Bristol & Avon Family History Society, Bristol Burgess Books, 1557-1995, Index & Transcripts 
(Bristol, 2004). 
73 A.F.J. Jurica and P. Ripley, eds., A Calendar of the Registers of the Freemen of the City of 
Gloucester, 1641-1838, Gloucestershire Record Series, 4 (Gloucester, 1991). 




London75 Apothecaries 1617-49 26 3 
          
177  
  1650-99 36 7 
          
823  
  1700-49 41 9 
          
237  
 Bowyers 1700-49 29 13 
            
40  
  1750-99 33 15 
            
20  
 Clockmakers 1650-99 23 19 
       
1,983  
  1700-49 26 9 
       
2,178  
  1750-99 73 15 
       
2,006  
 Clothworkers 1600-49 18 9 
       
2,085  
  1650-99 28 14 
       
2,372  
  1700-49 50 21 
       
1,743  
  1750-99 61 24 
       
1,198  
 Goldsmiths 1600-49 27 13 
       
1,057  
  1650-99 38 15 
       
1,501  
 Mercers 1600-49 42 24 
          
183  
  1650-99 52 25 
          
387  
  1700-49 70 37 
          
189  
  1750-99 57 37 




Taylors 1600-49 20 10 
       
4,998  
  1650-99 37 18 
       
3,868  
                                                 
75 Apothecaries: Guildhall Library, “Society of Apothecaries,” Freedom Register, MS 8206/1; 
Bowyers, Clothmakers, Goldsmiths, Mercers: Centre for Metropolitan History, Records of London 
Livery Companies Online. URL http://www.londonroll.org/. We used the underlying dataset 
supplied by Mark Merry and Matthew Davies; Clockmakers: Clockmakers Company, Freemen of 
the Worshipful Company of Clockmakers, 1631-1884 (George Daniels, Isle of Man: 1984); Merchant 
Taylors: Docklands Ancestors, Merchant Taylors’ Membership Index, 1530-1928 ([CD Rom] 
London, 2008); Stationers: Michael Turner, London Book Trades Database. URL 
http://lbt.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/. We used the underlying dataset shared by Michael Turner. 
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  1700-49 54 24 
       
1,673  
  1750-99 62 26 
          
179  
 Stationers 1600-49 34 15 
       
1,357  
  1650-99 45 19 
          
889  
  1700-49 62 21 
            
94  
  1750-99 68 17 
          
398  
France      
Dijon76 All 1693-1730  23 
       
1,822  
  1731-60  13 
       
2,397  
  1761-90  9 
       
3,661  
Paris77 All 1766-75  26 13,426 
 Locksmiths 1735-50  20 
          
186  
  1742-76  34 
          
346  
 Seamstress 1735-76  8 
       
5,509  
Rouen78 All 1600-99  54 
       
6,840  
  1700-99  59 
       
8,488  
German Europe      
Berlin*79 Bakers 1709-50 27  489 
 Butchers  36  
          
303  
 Construction  21  
          
480  
 Coopers  30  
            
89  
                                                 
76 E.J. Shephard Jr., ‘Social and Geographic Mobility of the Eighteenth-Century Guild Artisan: An 
Analysis of Guild Receptions in Dijon, 1700-90’, in: Kaplan and Koepp, eds., Work in France, 123. 
77 Registers of guild entries maintained by the royal procurator at the Châtelet of Paris, Archives 
Nationales, Paris Y 9330, Y 9331, and Y 9332; Locksmiths: Sonenscher, Work and Wages, 107; 
Seamstresses: Crowston, Fabricating Women, 329. 
78 Jean-Pierre Bardet, Rouen aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles: les mutations d'un espace social (Paris, 
1983), 237. 
79 Compiled and adapted from E. Kaeber, ed., Die Bürgerbücher und die Bürgerprotokollbücher 
Berlins von 1701-50 (Berlin, 1934), esp. tables 9-11. 
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 Metal  34  
          
689  
 Shoemakers  24  
          
913  
 Textiles  15  
       
2,499  
Gdansk/Danzig*80 Bakers 1640-1709 53  
          
416  
 Butchers  47  
          
181  
 Construction  38  
          
203  
 Coopers  58  
          
235  
 Textiles  45  
       
2,257  
Durlach81 Bakers 1700-99 55  131 
 Butchers  57  
          
103  
 Carpenters  55  
          
38  
 Coopers  50  
          
114  
 Joiners  42  38            
 Linenweavers  51  
          
57  
 Masons  31  
          
49  
 Shoemakers  61  
          
130  
 Tailors  44  
          
105  
Hildesheim82 Barbers 1700-49  13 16 
  1750-99  0 
            
23  
 Basketmakers 1700-49  32 
            
13  
  1750-99  67 
            
12  
 Blacksmiths 1700-49  50 
            
24  
                                                 
80 Compiled from Henning Penners-Ellward, Die Bürgerschaft nach Herkunft und Beruf 1547-
1709, PhD-dissertation Marburg an der Lahn, 1954, tables 4 and 5. 
81 Compiled from Otto Konrad Roller, ed., Die Einwohnerschaft der Stadt Durlach im 18. 
Jahrhundert in ihren wirtschaftlichen und kulturgeschichtlichen Verha ̈ltnissen dargestellt aus 
ihren Stammtafeln (Karlsruhe, 1907). 
82 Kaufhold, Handwerk der Stadt Hildesheim, 253-54 
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  1750-99  48 
            
23  
 Bookbinders 1750-99  50 
            
18  
 Smiths (other) 1700-49  34 
            
80  
  1750-99  49 
            
80  
 Tailors 1700-49  6 
            
68  
  1750-99  23 
            
99  
 Tinsmiths 1700-49  38 
            
13  
  1750-99  20 
            
10  
 Wheelwrights 1700-49  53 
            
15  
  1750-99  45 
            
11  
Vienna83 Bakers 1742 26  102 
 Bookbinders  56  
            
18  
 Brewers  1  
            
70  
 Butchers  47  
            
32  
 Cabinetmakers  14  
          
140  
 Coopers  22  
            
67  
 Goldsmiths  48  
          
116  
 Shoemakers  15  
          
555  
 Sword-cutlers  70  
            
36  
 Tailors  13  
          
640  
 Weavers  10  
            
31  
Wildberg84 All trades 1666-1760 >90 >80 >500 
 Worsted weavers 1598-1647  60 
          
247  
                                                 
83 Josef Ehmer, ‘Worlds of Mobility: Migration Patterns of Viennese Artisans in the Eighteenth 
Century’, in: Crossick, ed., The artisan and the European town, 180, 182. 
84 Ogilvie, State corporatism, 132, 171-72; Worsted weavers: Ogilvie, ‘Guilds, efficiency’, 309. 
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  1666-99  91 
          
131  
  1700-60  91 
          
228  
Italy      
Turin85 Tailors 1705  5 
          
288  
Low Countries      
Amsterdam86 Tailors 1730-1769 17  
       
1,345  
  1770-1798 23  
       
1,129  
Antwerp87 Coopers 1671-1700  24 
          
177  
  1701-50  30 
          
204  
  1751-93  35 
            
89  
 Shoemakers 1766-90  17 
          
127  
 Tailors 1714-79  22 
          
813  
Brussels88 Tailors 1694-1786  22 
          
828  
Delft89 Painters 1613 38  
            
32  
  1613-49 70  
            
92  
  1650-1679 75  
            
40  
Ghent90 Woodworkers 1616-30  23 
          
137  
  1631-67  0 
          
206  
                                                 
85 Cerutti, La ville et les métiers, 163, 167. 
86 Panhuysen, Maatwerk, 300. 
87 Coopers: Willems, ‘Loon naar werken?’, 46; Shoemakers: Bert De Munck, Technologies of 
learning: Apprenticeship in Antwerp from the 15th century to the end of the ancien régime 
(Turnhout, 2007) : 164; Tailors: Harald Deceulaer, Pluriforme patronen en een verschillende snit: 
sociaal-economische, institutionele en culturele transformaties in de kledingsector in Antwerpen, 
Brussel en Gent, 1585-1800 (Amsterdam, 2001) : 330. 
88 Deceulaer, Pluriforme patronen, 330. 
89 John Michael Montias, Artists and artisans in Delft: a socio-economic study of the seventeenth 
century (Princeton, 1982): 140. 
90 Johan Dambruyne, ‘De Gentse bouwvakambachten in sociaal-economisch perspectief (1540-
1795)’, in: C. Lis and H. Soly (eds.), Werken volgens de regels: Ambachten in Brabant en Vlaanderen, 
1500-1800 (Brussels, 1994): 72. 
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Haarlem91 Dyers 1663 83  36 
  1714 65  60 
Rotterdam92 Goldsmiths 1665 77  
            
34  
’s-Hertogenbosch93 Butchers 1749-75  100 
          
120  
 Coopers   9 
            
65  
 Goldsmiths   12 
            
17  
Spain      
Barcelona94 Bookbinders 1794-1835  33 
            
95  
Madrid**95 Various 1643-49 32  
          
569  
  1700-49 25 9 
       
2,187  
  1750-99 29 16 
       
3,233  
 
* refers to the use of citizenship registers; in other cases we rely on guild sources. 
** recalculated without the ‘unknowns’.  
                                                 
91 Janneke Tump, Ambachtelijk geschoold: Haarlemse en Rotterdamse ambachtslieden en de 
circulatie van technische kennis, ca. 1400-1720, PhD-thesis Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam 2012: 
131. 
92 Tump, Ambachtelijk geschoold, 133. 
93 Erfgoed ’s-Hertogenbosch, Bossche Ambachtsgilden 152 (butchers), 251 (Coopers), 314 
(Goldsmiths). 
94 Àngels Solà Parera, Craft Apprenticeship in Barcelona, 1760-1850, paper presented at the 
workshop “Apprenticeship in early modern Europe: one institution or many?” (3-4 July 2016, 
Utrecht). 
95 José Antolín Nieto Sánchez and Juan Carlos Zofío Llorente, ‘The return of the guilds: a view 




City Guild Period 
Local  
(%) Kin (%)  N  
England      
Boston96 all 1650-99  15             259  
  1700-49  64             411  
  1750-99  29          1,069  
Bristol97 all 1650-99 45 17          2,227  
  1700-49 53 10          5,290  
  1750-99 62 6        10,157  
Gloucester98 all 1600-49 36 11          1,789  
  1650-99 47 15          2,266  
  1700-49 55 18          1,576  
Leicester99 all 1600-49 42 22             131  
  1650-99 39 9               43  
  1700-49 41 7             199  
  1750-99 44 23             197  
Lincoln100 all 1650-99 40 23             603  
  1700-49 29 8             823  
  1750-99 36 8             748  
Liverpool101 all 1700-49 12 2             701  
London102 Various 1600-49 18 2 
      
101,914  
  1650-99 32 4 
      
145,180  
  1700-49 51 8 
      
106,307  
  1750-99 62 1        59,545  
Shrewsbury103 all 1650-99 39 28             331  
France      
Lyon104 silk 1710-39 29   
                                                 
96 Lincolnshire Family History Society, ‘Boston City Apprentices & Freemen’ (unpublished 
typescript). 
97 Bristol & Avon Family History Society, Transcript and Indexes of the Bristol Apprenticeship 
Books Volumes 1(o) to 1(z) 1724-2009 (Bristol, 2012). 
98 J. Barlow, ed., A Calendar of the Registers of Apprentices of the City of Gloucester, Bristol and 
Gloucester Archaeological Society, 2001 (v. 14), 1595 -1700 & v. 20 (1700-1834). 
99 H. Hartropp, Register of the freemen of Leicester including the apprentices sworn before successive 
mayors, 2 vols. (Leicester, 1927-33). 
100 Lincolnshire Family History Society, ‘Lincoln City Apprentices & Freemen’ (unpublished 
typescript). 
101 M. Power, F. Lewis, D. Ascott (1998). Liverpool Community, 1649-1750. [data collection]. UK 
Data Service. SN: 3882, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3882-1. 
102 C. Webb,  London Livery Company Apprenticeship Registers (London: Society of  Genealogists 
1994-2005);  Wallis, London Apprentices: Society of Apothecaries, 1617-1669 (London: Society of 
Genealogists, 2000); Records of London Livery Companies Online. URL http://www.londonroll.org/. 
103 Shropshire Archives MS6001/126; 6001/4263; 6001/5837; 6001/3360; 6001/4583. 
104 Maurice Garden, Lyon et les Lyonnais au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1970): 57, 63. 
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  1740-69 32   
  1770-90 29   
 various 1746-47 26              405  
Paris105 all 1761 72              815  
Low Countries      
Amsterdam106 surgeons 1597-1659 67           1,057  
Antwerp 107 cabinetmakers 1691-1760  3 412 
 carpenters 1701-90  8             975  
 coopers 1671-1700  34 635 
  1701-1750  30 479 
  1751-1793  17 186 
 silversmiths 1600-50 75  32 
  1650-1700 78  123 
  1700-50 83  58 
  1750-1800 90  31 
 tinsmiths 1711-50  25 150 
  1751-90  19 105 
Haarlem108 coopers 1649-68 3  61 
 shoemakers 1736-97 91 6 790 
Leiden109 surgeons 1683-1729 70 15 391 
Spain      
Barcelona110 fanmakers 1762-92 26 13 146 
 builders 1786-1820  35 56 
 silk-reeling 1760-1762 48  29 
 veil weaving 1825-1849 50  1,482 
 booksellers 1760-1788 26 15 39 
Madrid111 various 1607-99 7  215 
  1700-49 28  131 
  1750-99 47  289 
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